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Abstract 
The objective of this study is to examine the determinants of MIR rate in the Euro area 
for the period 2003Q1-2015Q3. By employing Fixed Effects, Random Effects and 
Dynamic OLS (DOLS) as econometric methodologies, I examine if the MIR rate is 
affected by the following macroeconomic factors: unemployment rate, inflation rate, 
GDP growth, political stability index and wages as % to GDP. All of these factors 
found to exert great significance to MIR rate and thus they have to be taken into 
consideration when macro-prudential policies are designing. 
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I. A Brief Literature Review 
Saunders and Schumacher (2000) studied the determinants of the net interest 
margin taking as sample banks from both the EU and the USA for the period 1988-
1995. They found that the major determinants of the net interest margin are capital to 
asset ratio, implicit interest payments, market power, opportunity cost and interest rate 
volatility. Brock and Suarez (2000) stated that bank spreads in the 1990s are influenced 
by inflation and GDP growth. 
Almeida and Divino (2015) examined for the period 2001-2012 the determinants of 
the banking spread in the Brazilian economy. Almeida and Divino (2015) found that 
administrative expenses, the Herfindahl-Hirschaman index and the total output 
measured by the GDP, are the main factors of the interest rate spread in Brazil. 
Perera and Wickramanayake (2016) examined for the period 1996-2010 the 
determinants of commercial bank retail interest rate adjustments having as sample 122 
countries. According to their findings, commercial bank retail interest rate is affected 
by both macroeconomic-governance and financial factors. Other studies which have 
attempted to identify the factors that affect the interest rate adjustments are these of 
Mojon (2000); Sander and Kleimeier (2004); Wang and Lee (2009); Mishra et al., 
(2010); Gigineishvili (2011).  
Islam and Nishiyama (2016) investigated the factors of bank net interest margins 
for the period 1997-2012 for the following counties: Bangladesh, India, Nepal and 
Pakistan. They found that inflation rate and economic growth significantly influence 
the interest margins in a negative manner. 
Other studies that have examined which macroeconomic variables affect interest 
rate margins are (Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994; Sander and Kleimeier, 2004; Égert et 
al., 2007) who tested the inflation rate as potential determinant, (Sander and Kleimeier, 
3 
 
2006; Égert et al., 2007; Claeys and Vennet, 2008) who examined the economic growth 
as potential determinant, (Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994; Mojon, 2000; Sander and 
Kleimeier, 2006; Claeys and Vennet, 2008; Wang and Lee, 2009) who investigated if 
interest rate volatility influences interest rate margins adjustments. 
Another recent study is this of Louri and Migiakis (2015) who studied which 
variables affect the margins that the Euro-area non-financial corporations (NFCs) pay 
for their bank loan for the period 2003-2014. In particular, Louri and Migiakis (2015) 
examined the determinants of bank lending margins for distressed and non-distressed 
Euro-area countries and their major finding is that prudence of banks’ management and 
market concentration are two significant factors that positively affect the bank lending 
margins in the Euro-area.  
The theme of the MIR rate is relatively new in the literature. In particular, as far as 
I know, Anastasiou, Louri and Tsionas (2016)1 is the only study which first utilized the 
theme of the MIR rate examining it as a potential determinant of the European Non-
performing loans.  
 
II. Data Issues and Description of Variables 
In the present study, I explore some macroeconomic determinants as potential 
factors that influence the MIR margin. MIR is a new type of interest rate-margin derived 
from the ECB Data Warehouse for the period 2003Q1-2015Q3. MIR rate (or margin) 
is defined as the difference between interest rates on consumer loans without guarantee 
or collateral and consumer loans with guarantee or collateral. This difference-margin 
comprises information about the assessment of borrowers’ credit risk. As a 
                                                                 
1 According to Anastasiou, Louri and Tsionas (2016), MIR interest rate margin found to be a crucial 
determinant of European NPLs (positively affecting them). 
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consequence, a greater (lower) MIR rate implies that we have borrowers with lower 
(higher) credibility. A rise of MIR rate will also signify that borrowers will have to 
undergo greater net-costs due to the fact that such borrowers are “riskier”. At this point 
it has to be noted that MIR rate captures only a narrow section of borrowers, since it 
does not capture those who take out mortgages or corporate borrowers.  
As far as I know this is the first empirical study which examines some macroeconomic 
factors as potential variables that affect MIR rate. 
From figures 1 and 2 we can observe a pictorial presentation of the evolution of 
MIR rate in the Euro area countries for the period 2003Q1-2015Q3. In order to have 
more presentable plots, I plotted the MIR rate for two distinct country groups, country 
group A and B, where in country group A (B) belong the countries which are 
characterized as core (periphery) Euro-area countries. 
*****Insert Figures 1 and 2 here***** 
The macroeconomic variables that were employed as explanatory variables are 
specified as follows: 
unemp: unemp stands for unemployment rate. Data for unemployment rate were 
collected from OECD. A country with high unemployment rate suggests that more 
people are unable to meet their debt obligations and hence this country will typically 
have more risky borrowers with less collateral. Thus, unemp is expected to have a 
positive sign.  
growth: This variable denotes the GDP growth rate. I collected data from OECD. GDP 
growth rate is expected to have a negative sign, since an economy with high growth 
rate is expected to have less risky-borrowers. GDP Growth rate directly influences the 
supply and the demand of loans and deposits and therefore the activities of banks. Kunt 
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et al., (1999) and Tarus et al., (2012) found an inverse relationship between economic 
growth rate and bank interest margins. 
inflrat: inflrat stands for inflation rate. Because of lack of data, I utilized the percentage 
change of CPI as a proxy for the inflation rate, also collected from OECD.  Inflat ion 
rate is expected to has either a positive (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1998) or a 
negative sign (Boyd et al. 2001; Abreu and Mendes, 2003; Islam and Nishiyama, 2016). 
politic_stab: politic_stab is an index obtained from Datastream Professional and 
denotes the political stability of a country. The higher the index is, the greater politica l 
stability prevails in the country. A more political stable country is expected to have less 
risky-borrowers than other countries which are political unstable and thus politic_stab 
is expected to have a negative sign. As far as I know this is the first empirical study 
which examines the variable politic_stab as a potential macroeconomic determinant of 
interest rate margin. 
wage: As wage, I utilized wage as % to GDP. As wage increases borrowers will have 
greater income and probably more collateral. Thus, borrowers with higher wage will 
seem more credible to banks and thus a lower MIR rate is expected. So, wage 
coefficient is expected to be negative. As far as I know this is the first empirical study 
which examines the variable wage as a potential macroeconomic determinant of interest 
rate margin. 
From table 1 we can see a correlation matrix of all of our variables. From the 
correlation matrix, we observe that are not recorded any extreme correlations between 
the variables.   
*****Insert Table 1 here***** 
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In table 2 they are available both the sources from which I took the data and the 
expected signs of the variables. 
*****Insert Table 2 here***** 
In table 3 I provide the descriptive statistics for all the variables and in table 4 the 
descriptive statistics of all the variables for each country. The countries that I included 
in my analysis are the following: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and 
Spain. 
*****Insert Tables 3 and 4 here***** 
III. Econometric Methodology 
In the present study, I utilized quarterly data for 15 Euro-area countries for the 
period 2003Q1-2015Q3. I have an unbalanced panel dataset which includes 732 
observations.  
As a first step, I examined the variables for unit roots existence. I tested for unit 
roots with the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. ADF test, which was firstly 
proposed by Dickey and Fuller (1979), has as a null hypothesis that all panels contain 
a unit root. From table 5 we perceive that all of our variables found to be stationary at 
level. 
*****Insert table 5 here***** 
Given that i, t, unemp, inflrat, growth, politic_stab and wage denote country, time, 
unemployment rate, inflation rate, GDP growth rate, political stability and wage % GDP 
respectively, I employ the following econometric model: 
𝑚𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐_𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽5𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
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The above econometric specification was estimated with Fixed Effects, Random 
Effects and DOLS estimation.  The reason why I employ DOLS as an alternat ive 
estimation method is twofold. Firstly, because I want to examine if there is a long-run 
relationship between mir and the macroeconomic explanatory variables which I 
employed, and secondly for robustness check of the Fixed Effects and the Random 
Effects results. 
Below I make a short presentation of the DOLS estimation method.  
Panel DOLS estimates 
To estimate the long-run relationship between variables there is a variety of 
estimators. These include within-group and between-group fully modified OLS 
(FMOLS) estimators and dynamic OLS (DOLS) estimators. FMOLS (DOLS) is a non-
parametric (parametric) approach to dealing with correlation. In DOLS methodology 
lags and leads are included in order to deal with both the problems of the existence or 
absence of cointegration and the irrespectively order of integration. In our case 2 leads 
and lags were introduced. 
Stock and Watson (1993) developed the dynamic OLS (DOLS) model which 
allows variables to be integrated of alternative orders. Stock and Watson (1993) 
suggested a parametric approach for estimating long-run equilibria in systems that 
might comprise variables with different order of integration but still cointegrated. Last 
but not least, after Monte Carlo simulations they found that DOLS is more favorable, 
especially in small samples. 
Their basic model was the following: 
0 1
p
t t i t i t
i p
y x c x e  

     ,  
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where 
1

 is the dynamic OLS estimator and it is asymptotically normally 
distributed. 
Kao and Chiang (2000), Mark and Sul (2003), and Pedroni (2001) proposed 
extensions of the Saikkonen (1992) and Stock and Watson (1993) DOLS estimator to 
panel data settings. Panel DOLS involves augmenting the panel cointegrat ing 
regression equation with cross-section specific lags and leads itx  to eliminate the 
asymptotic endogeneity and serial correlation. Pedroni (2001) has suggested a between-
dimension, group-means panel DOLS estimator that incorporates corrections for 
endogeneity and serial correlation parametrically. Pedroni (2001) used the following 
regression model which includes lead and lag dynamics:  
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and itz  is the 1)1(2 k  vector of regressors 
   iititKitkitiitit yyyxxxxz   ~;, ,...... ; the subscript 1 outside the brackets in (*) 
indicate that only the first element of the vector is taken to obtain the pooled slope 
coefficient. 
Mark and Sul (2003) have developed a new DOLS estimator which allows for 
simultaneous dependence between cross-sectional and time series. According to their 
study, the possible endogeneity can be eliminated by projecting uit into the lags and 
leads  
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orthogonal to all leads and lags of ,i tx . 
Finally, Kao and Chiang (2000) found that DOLS estimator is asymptotica lly 
unbiased and normally distributed, even in the present of endogenous regressors. 
 
IV. Estimation Results  
After the estimation of my model both with the Fixed Effects and the Random 
Effects approach (Wooldridge, 2010), I provide the corresponding results in tables 6 
and 7 respectively. Tables 6 and 7 include the estimated coefficients with their 
corresponding robust standard errors after the Fixed Effects and Random Effects 
estimation method respectively. At that point it has to be noted that the probability value 
of the Hausman test found to be equal to 0.000 rejecting the null hypothesis and thus 
Fixed Effects found to be a more appropriate method than the Random Effects method. 
However, I also provide the estimation results from the Random Effects approach in 
order to give an extra robust econometric evidence.  
*****Insert Tables 6 and 7 here***** 
All the variables found to exert a great significance on the MIR rate. Also, all 
variables found to have the proper sign as we expected. Specifically, regarding the 
Fixed Effects approach, the coefficient of unemployment rate found to be positive and 
equal to 0.116. Variables growth, politic_stab and wage found to exert a great negative 
impact on MIR rate with estimated coefficients equal to -0.225, -1.470 and -0.334 
respectively. Inflation rate found to be significant and positive supporting the study of 
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Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1998). The same results have been found with the 
Random Effects approach regarding the signs and the statistical significance.  
Concerning the DOLS methodology, the estimated long-run coefficients with their 
corresponding standards errors can be found at table 8. 
*****Insert Table 8 here***** 
The results from DOLS method confirm the corresponding results of both the Fixed 
and the Random Effects method, apart from the result of the variable inflrat. 
In general, all the variables found to have a great impact on the MIR rate and also 
all the variables found to have the expected signs. In particular, the long-run estimated 
coefficients of unemp, growth, politic_stab and wage found to be equal to 0.170, -0.595, 
-1.311 and -0.701 respectively. 
As a consequence, the results are robust to alternative econometric specifications.  
Nevertheless, the sign of inflrat was not found to be compatible with the corresponding 
sign of the Fixed (and Random) Effects approach. In the DOLS estimation method, 
variable inflrat found to negatively affect the MIR rate and thus this result provides 
further support of the findings of Boyd et al. (2001), Abreu and Mendes (2003) and 
Islam and Nishiyama (2016).   
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V. Conclusions  
The objective of this study is to examine the causes of MIR rate in the euro area for 
the period 2003Q1-2015Q3. By employing Fixed Effects, Random Effects and 
Dynamic OLS (DOLS) as econometric methodologies I found that MIR rate is 
explained by the following macroeconomic factors: unemployment rate, inflation rate, 
GDP growth political stability index and wages as % to GDP. All of these factors found 
to exert great significance to MIR rate. The estimation results with Fixed Effects, 
Random Effects and DOLS are very similar and thus my results provide strong robust 
econometric evidence. Such findings can be helpful when designing macro-prudentia l 
policies. Moreover, such findings could be useful for economic policy makers (in 
particular for monetary authorities). 
In terms of directions for future research, other extra independent variables could 
be employed-tested such as tax on personal income, corruption index, business cycle 
and money supply. Because of lack of data and a potential multicollinearity problem, I 
could not delve into the literature and examine further potential factors that affect MIR 
rate. However, a step as such could broaden the horizon for a further research. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Correlation Matrix 
 mir unemp inflrat growth politic_stab wage 
mir 1.000 - - - - - 
unemp 0.074 1.000 - - - - 
inflrat 0.235 -0.301 1.000 - - - 
growth -0.126 -0.166 0.130 1.000 - - 
politic_stab -0.241 -0.201 -0.017 0.220 1.000 - 
wage -0.295 -0.095 -0.051 0.119 0.522 1.000 
Notes: unemp, inflrat, growth, politic_stab and wage stand for unemployment rate, inflation rate, 
GDP growth rate, political stability and wage %GDP respectively.  
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Table 2: Data Sources and Expected Signs 
Panel A: Data Sources 
mir ECB DATA WHAREHOUSE 
unemp OECD 
inflrat OECD 
growth OECD 
politic_stab DATASTREAM 
wage DATASTREAM 
Panel B: Expected Signs 
unemp (+) 
inflrat (+)/(-) 
growth (-) 
politic_stab (-) 
wage (-) 
Notes: unemp, inflrat, growth, politic_stab and wage stand for unemployment rate, inflation rate, 
GDP growth rate, political stability and wage %GDP respectively.  
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
mir 4.044 1.141 1.630 7.200 
unemp 10.318 4.817 1.800 29.100 
inflrat 0.596 0.498 -1.709 7.762 
growth 0.322 0.941 -12.399 7.352 
politic_stab 5.324 0.658 4.070 6.717 
wage 33.706 5.882 22.300 48.900 
Notes: unemp, inflrat, growth, politic_stab and wage stand for unemployment rate, inflation rate, 
GDP growth rate, political stability and wage %GDP respectively.       
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics by Country 
Country stats mir unemp inflrat growth politic_stab wage 
Austria 
mean 3.489 4.782 0.478 0.438 6.075 39.151 
min 2.100 3.100 -0.305 -1.988 5.909 37.200 
max 5.490 6.000 1.506 2.010 6.447 41.700 
       
Belgium 
mean 3.936 7.919 0.464 0.440 6.061 36.850 
min 2.440 6.200 -0.577 -2.093 5.662 35.700 
max 5.490 9.400 1.604 1.635 6.383 38.500 
       
Finland 
mean 3.107 8.712 0.462 0.426 6.550 38.954 
min 1.630 5.600 -0.673 -6.892 6.214 36.500 
max 5.590 13.300 1.537 3.090 6.717 45.200 
       
France 
mean 3.813 9.709 0.414 0.374 5.857 37.460 
min 2.420 6.700 -0.366 -1.582 5.595 35.800 
max 5.370 29.100 1.219 1.242 6.178 39.200 
       
Germany 
mean 4.261 8.191 0.356 0.316 6.000 41.631 
min 2.680 4.800 -0.487 -4.454 5.682 36.600 
max 5.590 18.800 1.088 2.026 6.317 48.900 
       
Greece 
mean 5.749 14.062 0.717 0.218 4.747 25.422 
min 4.620 7.400 -1.709 -4.770 4.369 22.300 
max 7.200 28.000 2.160 3.066 5.001 28.600 
       
Ireland 
mean 4.193 8.177 0.489 1.095 5.894 36.412 
min 2.940 3.700 -0.898 -4.071 5.604 31.900 
max 6.360 15.400 1.676 6.211 6.133 40.900 
       
Italy 
mean 3.899 9.410 0.647 0.119 4.696 27.840 
min 2.200 5.700 -0.187 -2.910 4.256 26.500 
max 6.520 13.700 1.824 1.556 5.042 29.400 
       
Lithuania 
mean 3.504 11.775 0.772 1.068 4.716 31.850 
min 1.780 3.900 -1.541 -12.399 4.070 29.600 
max 5.520 18.500 4.370 4.835 5.193 35.600 
       
Luxembourg 
mean 3.939 4.709 0.534 0.655 6.183 42.374 
min 2.590 1.800 -1.187 -5.709 5.905 38.700 
max 5.570 7.300 1.620 5.291 6.464 46.000 
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Netherlands 
mean 4.575 4.373 0.495 0.460 6.283 39.550 
min 3.310 2.000 -0.617 -3.315 6.028 37.400 
max 6.470 8.200 1.763 1.762 6.543 43.100 
       
Portugal 
mean 4.364 9.111 0.723 0.300 5.291 37.085 
min 2.790 4.000 -0.724 -2.300 5.059 33.900 
max 6.360 18.400 3.204 2.229 5.473 38.900 
       
Slovakia 
mean . 14.828 1.110 0.908 4.890 29.500 
min . 8.700 -0.569 -9.225 4.649 27.100 
max . 19.900 7.762 7.352 5.125 33.000 
       
Slovenia 
mean 3.881 7.182 1.050 0.621 5.138 43.595 
min 2.780 4.200 -1.288 -4.518 4.873 41.500 
max 6.030 11.200 3.395 3.633 5.428 45.900 
       
Spain 
mean 3.753 15.840 0.660 0.517 5.624 38.114 
min 2.380 8.000 -0.683 -1.597 5.069 36.200 
max 5.880 27.100 1.747 1.592 6.279 40.500 
       
Notes: unemp, inflrat, growth, politic_stab and wage stand for unemployment rate, inflation rate, GDP growth 
rate, political stability and wage %GDP respectively. 
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Table 5: ADF Unit root tests 
VARIABLES P_values Statistics 
mir 0.000 -19.048 
unemp 0.000 -18.997 
inflrat 0.000 -41.629 
growth 0.000 -42.621 
politic_stab 0.000 -16.763 
wage 0.000 -20.584 
Notes: (a) ADF test has as a null hypothesis that there is unit root, (b) unemp, inflrat, growth, 
politic_stab and wage stand for unemployment rate, inflation rate, GDP growth rate, political 
stability and wage %GDP respectively, (c) The null hypothesis of unit root is rejected at the 1% 
significance level for all variables. 
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Table 6: Estimation Results with Fixed Effects, 2003Q1-2015Q3 
VARIABLES mir 
unempit 
0.116*** 
(0.009) 
inflratit 
0.231*** 
(0.035) 
growthit 
-0.225*** 
(0.023) 
politic_stabit 
-1.470*** 
(0.163) 
wage it 
-0.334*** 
(0.037) 
Constant 
24.110*** 
(1.882) 
Diagnostics 
Observations 732 
Number of countries 15 
R2 0.350 
Notes: (a) *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively, (b) 
numbers in parentheses denote robust standard errors, (c) unemp, inflrat, growth, politic_stab and 
wage stand for unemployment rate, inflation rate, GDP growth rate, political stability and wage 
%GDP respectively. 
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Table 7: Estimation Results with Random Effects, 2003Q1-2015Q3 
VARIABLES mir 
unempit 
0. 087*** 
(0.008) 
inflratit 
0. 301*** 
(0.038) 
growthit 
-0. 165*** 
(0. 019) 
politic_stabit 
-0. 512*** 
(0. 097) 
wage it 
-0. 109*** 
(0. 015) 
Constant 
11.233*** 
(0.457) 
Diagnostics 
Observations 732 
Number of countries 15 
R2 0.285 
Notes: (a) *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively, (b) 
numbers in parentheses denote robust standard errors, (c) unemp, inflrat, growth, politic_stab and 
wage stand for unemployment rate, inflation rate, GDP growth rate, political stability and wage 
%GDP respectively. 
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Table 8: Estimation Results with DOLS, 2003Q1-2015Q3 
VARIABLES mir 
unempit 
0.170*** 
(0.009) 
inflratit 
-0.246*** 
(0.118) 
growthit 
-0.595*** 
(0.065) 
politic_stabit 
-1.311*** 
(0.118) 
wage it 
-0.701*** 
(0.030) 
Diagnostics 
Observations 691 
Number of countries 15 
R2 0.652 
Notes: (a) *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level 
respectively, (b) numbers in parentheses denote robust standard errors, (c) unemp, inflrat, 
growth, politic_stab and wage stand for unemployment rate, inflation rate, GDP growth rate, 
political stability and wage %GDP respectively. 
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Figures 
Figure 1: The evolution of MIR rate in Euro area countries – Country Group A (2003Q1-
2015Q3) 
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Figure 2: The evolution of MIR rate in Euro area countries – Country Group B (2003Q1-
2015Q3) 
 
